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KELO, CONSERVATION EASEMENTS, AND FOREVER:
WHY EMINENT DOMAIN IS NOT A SUFFICIENT CHECK
ON CONSERVATION EASEMENTS’ PERPETUAL
DURATION
DERRICK P. FELLOWS*
INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem of Perpetuity
Kelo v. City of New London affirmed that promoting economic
development is a permissible public purpose sufficient to justify taking
private property by eminent domain and that a legislative body is to re-
ceive broad deference in making this determination.1 Soon thereafter,
many state courts and legislatures reacted to Kelo by restricting local and
state governments’ power to condemn private property for purposes of
economic development.2 Most commentators have harshly criticized Kelo,
both in academic journals and in the popular press.3
Professor Gerald Korngold argues that Kelo was decided correctly
and that eminent domain is essential in the context of conservation ease-
ments.4 As Professor Korngold notes, conservation easements are usually
of unlimited duration5 and are designed to preserve the current state of
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, William & Mary School of Law.
1 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 469, 481 (2005).
2 Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private Conservation Easements:
Promoting Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the Public Land Use Process, 2007 UTAH
L. REV. 1039, 1082–83 [hereinafter Korngold, Contentious Issues]; see also 13 RICHARD
R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79F.03[3][b][iv] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2009)
(detailing states’ anti-Kelo legislation and constitutional amendments).
3 Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational Conflicts of Real Property Law:
Preserving Free Markets and Personal Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 1525, 1579 (2007) [hereinafter Korngold, Intergenerational Conflicts]; see also 13
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 79F.03[3][b][iv] (noting that the public
reaction against Kelo was “swift, intense, and unprecedented”).
4 Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 2, at 1082–83.
5 Id. at 1051; Federico Cheever & Nancy A. McLaughlin, Why Environmental Lawyers
Should Know (and Care) About Land Trusts and Their Private Land Conservation
Transactions, [2004] 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,223, 10,226 (Mar. 2004) (noting
that the “vast majority” of conservation easements are perpetual in duration).
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land in perpetuity.6 These easements will likely conflict with future land-
use needs as societal goals, patterns of living, and scientific knowledge
change over time.7 Conservation easements’ perpetual and inflexible nature
will thus potentially cause major problems for future generations, and con-
servation easements on specific parcels of land might eventually conflict
with the public interest.8 Eminent domain is necessary to rectify the rare
situations when private arrangements such as conservation easements
frustrate an essential public need.9 A flexible power of eminent domain is
a necessary tool for future generations to “remedy the missteps of the past
and develop community-based, land use plans that will meet the currently
unknowable, ultimately pressing needs of the future.”10
One of Professor Korngold’s “currently unknowable, ultimately
pressing needs of the future”11 might have already become a need of the
present: the development of renewable energy resources. Poorly located
conservation easements can prevent the development of renewable energy
resources. Conservation easements with the purpose of preserving open
6 Korngold, Intergenerational Conflicts, supra note 3, at 1575.
7 See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 2, at 1063 (“[H]istory shows us that the
constant shifts in the human condition, technology, and economic arrangements have
meant differing uses of land over the generations.”). Concepts of what creates an ideal
society change over time. See Korngold, Intergenerational Conflicts, supra note 3, at 1554.
So does the cultural understanding of what constitutes a proper conservation goal. See
Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA.
L. REV. 739, 760 (2002). Moreover, scientific knowledge regarding ecosystems is not yet
fully developed and may one day suggest a need to alter current land uses. See id. at
757–58. For example, poorly placed conservation easements might impede “smart growth”
and exacerbate urban sprawl. See id. at 762–63; see also Dana Joel Gattuso, Conservation
Easements: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, NAT’L POL’Y ANALYSIS (May 2008), http://
www.nationalcenter.org/NPA569.html (listing examples of how conservation easements
might become antiquated, useless, and even harmful as cultural norms and scientific
knowledge evolve).
8 Korngold, Intergenerational Conflicts, supra note 3, at 1576. Current plans to protect the
environment will almost certainly need to be revised in the future as current scientific
knowledge becomes outdated. Mahoney, supra note 7, at 783. Where future generations
have the unambiguous ability to alter outdated policies, this poses little problem. Id.
“When long-range plans are deliberately designed to thwart future modification, however,
implicit assumptions that today’s ecological science is correct can no longer be dismissed as
the inevitable hubris of each generation, but instead should be recognized as a potential
source of harm.” Id. at 783–84.
9 Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 2, at 1083.
10 Korngold, Intergenerational Conflicts, supra note 3, at 1578; accord Korngold, Contentious
Issues, supra note 2, at 1083 (arguing that Kelo “provid[es] government with the tool
necessary to meet changing needs and correct the errors of the past”).
11 Korngold, Intergenerational Conflicts, supra note 3, at 1578.
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space, for example, might not be amenable to wind turbines any more than
to shopping centers.12 Given the level of NIMBYism (derived from “not-in-
my-back-yard” sentiment) raised in opposition to wind turbines in partic-
ular,13 one suspects that some conservation easements may even include
provisions expressly forbidding the placement of wind turbines on the bur-
dened property. If the terms of conservation easements can be read to
exclude the development of wind farms, transmission lines, and so forth,
then this means that as the amount of acreage burdened by conservation
easements increases, the amount of acreage available for renewable power
generation likewise decreases. Therefore, the competing policy goals of
preserving open space and developing renewable energy resources might
clash, particularly as governments increasingly mandate renewable energy
standards (also known as renewable portfolio standards, “RPS”).14 Emi-
nent domain can thus be used to aid the development of renewable energy
sources when poorly placed conservation easements might otherwise im-
pede such development.
B. Responding to Professor Korngold
Although Professor Korngold appears to be correct in arguing that
eminent domain provides a way for allowing necessary development to
proceed in the face of poorly placed conservation easements,15 his argument
ignores the fact that many conservation easements are held not by private
parties but by governments and government agencies, over which a state
12 See, e.g., Matthew J. Richardson, Note, Conservation Easements as Charitable Trusts in
Kansas: Striking the Appropriate Balance Among the Grantor’s Intent, the Public’s Interest,
and the Need for Flexibility, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 175, 175–76 (2009) (posing a hypothetical
scenario in which local residents object to a wind farm being built on ranch land encum-
bered by a conservation easement and suggesting that the wind farm goes against the
easement grantor’s intent to prevent “any development” on the ranch land).
13 See Eric R.A.N. Smith & Holly Klick, Explaining NIMBY Opposition to Wind Power,
ALLACADEMIC, 2–4 (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p279566_index
.html (follow the “Click here to view the document” hyperlink) (noting the resistance that
wind farms often face). Cf. Leora Broydo Vestel, On the Radar, and That’s the Problem,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010, at B1 (noting that the U.S. Department of Defense has objected
to several wind turbine installations because of potential interference to radar systems).
14 See States with Renewable Portfolio Standards, OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY &
RENEWABLE ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/
renewable_portfolio_states.cfm (last updated June 16, 2009) (noting that twenty-four
states and the District of Columbia have enacted binding RPS and that five other states
have established nonbinding renewable energy goals).
15 See, e.g., Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 2, at 1083.
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or local government will have little, if any, power of eminent domain.16
Governments at all levels are “increasingly rely[ing] on conservation ease-
ments to accomplish land protection goals,”17 although precise documen-
tation of the extent of governments’ conservation easement holdings is
not available.18 The U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), for example,
holds a large number of agricultural conservation easements and allocated
over $790 million to acquire permanent conservation easements in 2004
alone.19 The Natural Resources Conservation Service (“NRCS”), a branch
of the USDA, held more than 11,000 conservation easements covering a
total of over two million acres in 2005.20 Conservation easements are also
“an important instrnment [sic] in the construction and design of the
habitat conservation plans that landowners and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service enter into under the Endangered Species Act.”21 In California, in
2003, the top four conservation easement holders, in terms of the number
of conservation easements held, were all state and federal governments
or agencies.22 There were an estimated 50,000 government-held conser-
vation easements in the early 2000s in New Jersey alone; local and
regional private land trusts, by contrast, held about 18,000 conservation
16 See infra Part I.
17 Nancy A. McLaughlin, Amending Perpetual Conservation Easements: A Case Study of the
Myrtle Grove Controversy, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (2006) [hereinafter McLaughlin,
Amending Perpetual Conservation Easements]; see also Mahoney, supra note 7, at 752
(noting that government agencies widely use conservation easements). The same is true
for the nonprofit sector. McLaughlin, Amending Perpetual Conservation Easements, supra,
at 1033. See also Bruce I. Knight, Chief, Natural Res. Conservation Serv., Remarks at the
National Land Conservation Conference: Strengthening Conservation Easements (Oct. 17,
2005), http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/news/speeches05/coneasments.html (“Over the past 20
years, we’ve also worked with land trusts on conservation easements. And our easement
portfolio has grown exponentially.”).
18 Nancy A. McLaughlin & Mark Benjamin Machlis, Protecting the Public Interest and
Investment in Conservation: A Response to Professor Korngold’s Critique of Conservation
Easements, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1561, 1563 n.5.
19 Amy Wilson Morris, Easing Conservation? Conservation Easements, Public Accountability
and Neoliberalism, 39 GEOFORUM 1215, 1219 (2008). Agricultural landowners own the
majority of the private land in the United States, and consequently many conservation
easements are sited on farms, ranches, and working forests. Id. at 1217.
20 Knight, supra note 17.
21 Mahoney, supra note 7, at 752.
22 See Morris, supra note 19, at 1220 tbl.1 (listing data). The California Department of Fish
& Game held 264 conservation easements, the Natural Resources Conservation Service
(a branch of the USDA) held 246, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service held 199, and the
California Department of Parks & Recreation held 144. Id. By contrast, the Land Trust
of Napa County, which was the fifth largest easement holder and the largest private
easement holder, held only 89 conservation easements. Id.
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easements nationwide in 2003.23 Government entities acquire most of the
conservation easements conveyed in Maryland and Virginia.24 In October
2007, for example, the Virginia Outdoors Foundation held 2217 open-
space easements totaling 409,383 acres—more than 1.5% of the total
land in the state.25
Also suggestive of governments’ role in holding conservation ease-
ments is private land trusts’ increasing use of a type of transaction known
as a preacquisition or a “prearranged flip.”26 In these transactions, the land
trust acquires a conservation easement and then sells it to a government
agency soon thereafter.27 This practice appears to be prevalent, although
only limited data exist as to the precise quantity of land under easement
transferred to federal and state government agencies in this manner.28
Taking into account the increasing role of governments in acquiring
conservation easements, this note will explore the difficulties that arise
when a state or local government determines that a conservation easement
should be modified or terminated to accommodate development that is
determined to be necessary for the public good.29 Although the condemna-
tion process will be fairly straightforward when the easement is held by
a private land trust or other private party, sovereign immunity and related
issues interfere when the easement is held by another government body.30
The difficulties in modifying and terminating government-held conserva-
tion easements become a particularly important issue when the conserva-
tion easement is held by the federal government,31 which, like a private
23 Morris, supra note 19, at 1220.
24 McLaughlin & Machlis, supra note 18, at 1563–64.
25 Nancy A. McLaughlin, Condemning Open Space: Making Way for National Interest
Electric Transmission Corridors (Or Not), 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 399, 404 [hereinafter
McLaughlin, Condemning Open Space]. The Virginia Outdoors Foundation is a state
entity that acquires and manages the majority of the conservation easements conveyed in
Virginia under the Open-Space Land Act, enacted in 1966. Id. at 402–03.
26 See Gattuso, supra note 7 (noting that land trusts increasingly use preacquisitions).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 This note does not advocate terminating conservation easements—or condemning
property interests of any sort—indiscriminately. Nevertheless, it seems highly likely that
some conservation easements will need to be modified or terminated at some point in the
future to legitimately further the public good. The scope of this note is limited to those
rare situations.
30 See infra Part I.
31 See, e.g., Joe Lanane, PGA Championship Visitors in Wisconsin to Rough It with Just One
Ramp, DAILY REP. (Milwaukee, WI), Aug. 10, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 16426554
(federal conservation easement blocking Wisconsin Department of Transportation’s con-
struction of an interstate highway interchange).
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land trust, might be geographically distant from the community in which
the easement is situated and might usurp the community’s role in demo-
cratically shaping local public policy.32 Alternative methods of obtaining
development rights over lands encumbered by government-held conser-
vation easements or of regulating the placement of these easements ex
ante will then be necessary.33
Part I of this note analyzes the constitutional and statutory
restrictions on exercising the power of eminent domain over government-
held conservation easements. Government bodies often have only a lim-
ited power of eminent domain over one another, and thus condemning
government-held conservation easements is an inadequate remedy to
counteract the otherwise perpetual nature of many conservation ease-
ments. Part II analyzes alternative methods of obtaining development
rights, such as invoking the doctrine of changed conditions and initiating
cy pres proceedings, and discusses the difficulties that will arise with these
methods if courts begin applying charitable trust principles to conserva-
tion easements. Part III proposes legislative reforms that might minimize
the adverse impact of conservation easements’ perpetual duration. Such
reforms include (1) legislation authorizing public bodies to modify and
terminate conservation easements outside of condemnation proceedings,
even if charitable trust principles are held to apply to conservation ease-
ments, and (2) legislation requiring all future conservation easements to
comply with each locality’s comprehensive plan by requiring grantors of
conservation easements to obtain permission from a locality’s zoning board
before granting the easement. Part IV proposes a Medicaid-like system of
providing states with funding to acquire and administer conservation ease-
ments and concludes that by divesting the federal government of its con-
servation easements and delegating the handling of these easements to
the states, more flexible and effective land conservation easements could
be put into place.
32 See Korngold, Intergenerational Conflicts supra note 3, at 1576–77 (noting that, when a
conservation easement is held by a private, perhaps geographically distant organization
rather than the local government, the “key matter of local land use” of whether the public
interest in economic development of a parcel of land outweighs the public interest in
conservation “will not be the subject of public policy debate based on the democratic process
but rather left to a private group with a predetermined agenda.”); see also Mahoney, supra
note 7, at 775–76 (“Nonprofit organizations and governmental entities will pursue their own
agendas, which will be in large part a function of the interests and preferences of their
respective constituencies, and may or may not coincide with broader societal interests.”).
33 See infra Parts II–IV.
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I. RESTRICTIONS ON CONDEMNING GOVERNMENT-HELD
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
A. Principles of Eminent Domain Affecting Conservation
Easements Held by Public Bodies at the Same Level of
Government
1. The Prior Public Use Doctrine
Although only the state itself has the inherent power of eminent
domain at the state level,34 a state may delegate this power to its subdivi-
sions and agencies.35 A state may delegate its power of eminent domain to
public officials, special commissions, municipalities, counties, towns, other
public corporations, public service corporations, private corporations, and,
under certain circumstances, individuals.36 Although state legislatures can
authorize others to exercise the power of eminent domain, they cannot
divest themselves of their power of eminent domain entirely.37
The prior public use doctrine proscribes the condemnation of land
set aside for a public use to devote it to an inconsistent public use, absent
express or implied legislative authorization to do so.38 In doing so, this doc-
trine limits the power of eminent domain that public bodies at the same
level of government may exercise over property interests held by one
another.39 The prior public use doctrine is necessary to regulate the situ-
ation when several government entities simultaneously have only a general
34 See 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.01[1] (rev. 3d ed. 2010)
(noting that states have an inherent power of eminent domain as sovereign powers); id. at
§ 3.03[3][a] (noting that local governments are not sovereign and therefore may not exercise
the power of eminent domain without authorization from the state constitution or legis-
lature or under home rule authority); A.S. Klein, Annotation, Power of Eminent Domain
as Between State and Subdivision or Agency Thereof, or as Between Different Subdivisions
or Agencies Themselves, 35 A.L.R.3D 1293, 1326 at § 8 (1971) (noting that a governmental
or political subdivision of a state has no inherent power to condemn the property of the
state itself).
35 Klein, supra note 34, at 1326 § 8.
36 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.03[3][a], [3][b][i]–[iii] (rev.
3d ed. 2010).
37 Id. at § 3.03[1] (noting that state legislatures cannot “delegate[ ] away” their power of
eminent domain).
38 See id. at § 2.17.
39 See id. (noting that the prior public use doctrine applies to condemning authorities with
“equally delegated powers of eminent domain.”); Klein, supra note 34, at 1334 § 11 (noting
that the rule applies to “condemnation by a governmental subdivision of a state, or its
agency, of the property of another such subdivision or agency”).
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delegation of eminent domain authority from the legislature.40 This doc-
trine is designed to prevent a “free for all of battling entities all equipped
with eminent domain power, passing title back and forth.”41
A condemnor with a delegated power of eminent domain (such as
a municipal corporation) generally may not condemn property already
devoted to a public use where “the proposed use will either destroy the
existing use or interfere with it to such an extent as is tantamount to
destruction,” unless the legislature has authorized it to do so expressly
or by necessary implication.42 A general delegation of eminent domain
power from the legislature does not provide authorization for this type of
condemnation without legislative intent to do so, that is, where “it can be
clearly inferred from the nature and situation of the proposed work, and
from the impracticability of constructing it without encroaching on land
already used by the public.”43 Such an implication does not arise unless
the denial of eminent domain authority would frustrate the exercise of a
power that the legislature has expressly granted to the condemnor.44 If the
public purpose can be accomplished without taking public-use land, there
is no such implication.45
The prior public use doctrine exempts land from condemnation
when the owner of the land is legally obligated to maintain the public use
to which the land is devoted.46 Thus, this doctrine does not exempt land
from condemnation when: the owner merely voluntarily devotes the land
to a public use; the land is vacant or used for purposes not pertaining to
the corporation’s franchise, even when the corporation (such as a school)
is legally obligated to serve the public; or the land was originally acquired
40 United States v. Acquisition of 0.3114 Cuerdas of Condemnation Land, 753 F. Supp.
50, 54 (D.P.R. 1990).
41 Id.
42 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.17 (rev. 3d ed. 2010). The
minority rule requires only that the proposed use “materially impair or interfere with
the existing public use of the subject property rather than requiring an interference so
severe as to amount to a destruction.” Id. Tennessee and Florida appear to follow the
minority rule. See id. at n.4 (citing cases).
43 Id. at § 2.17.
44 Id. at § 2.17[1]. Jurisdictions are divided as to the degree of necessity required to allow
condemnation of public-use land: some jurisdictions require a degree of necessity such
that the grant of eminent domain power would be otherwise defeated and further require
that this necessity arise out of physical conditions over which the condemnor has no control;
other jurisdictions take into account factors of practicability and economy and require only
a reasonable necessity, even where alternative procedures are possible. Id. at § 2.17[2].
45 Id. at § 2.17[1].
46 Id. at § 2.17[5].
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for a public use but was later abandoned or put to a private use.47 However,
the method by which the condemnee originally acquired the property (for
example, by purchase or by eminent domain) is irrelevant in this context.48
Under the consistent use exception, property devoted to a public
use may still be condemned when that public use will not be “materially
impaired or destroyed” by the proposed use, even if some inconvenience
might be caused to the original user.49 Regardless, the property may not
be condemned to devote it to the same use but in the hands of a different
owner, unless the condemnation proceedings will transfer title from a
public service corporation (such as a public utility) to a municipality or a
purely public corporation.50 Most economic development, however, would
seem to be inconsistent with conservation, and so this exception would
be ineffective in allowing public bodies with a general grant of eminent
domain to condemn government-held conservation easements to further
such development.
2. The Paramount Public Use Doctrine
The paramount public use doctrine, where adopted, provides greater
flexibility for courts to allow condemnation of land devoted to a public
use.51 An exception to the prior public use doctrine,52 the paramount public
use doctrine is employed by some courts to allow condemnation of prop-
erty devoted to public use even when the existing use would be practically
destroyed if the condemnor can show that the proposed use is of para-
mount public importance and that its purpose cannot be accomplished in
any other way.53 In other words, the paramount public use doctrine requires
47 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.17[5] (rev. 3d ed. 2010).
48 Id. at § 2.17.
49 Id. at § 2.17[8]; accord Klein, supra note 34, at 1337 § 12; see also United States v.
Acquisition of 0.3114 Cuerdas of Condemnation Land, 753 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.P.R. 1990)
(noting that the prior public use doctrine requires specific legislative authorization to
condemn public-use land for a “different (and inconsistent) public use”).
50 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.17[9] (rev. 3d ed. 2010). The
rationale behind this rule is that there is an increased public benefit inuring from
governmental operation. Id.
51 See Joris Naiman, Comment, Judicial Balancing of Uses for Public Property: The
Paramount Public Use Doctrine, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 893, 893, 895 (1990).
52 Id. at 898.
53 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.17 (rev. 3d ed. 2010). See also
id. at n.6 (listing cases in Texas); Klein, supra note 34, at 1340 § 13 (listing cases in Arizona
and Texas). See generally Linda A. Sharp, Annotation, Construction and Application of
Rule Requiring Public Use for Which Property Is Condemned to Be “More Necessary” or
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the court to balance the uses proposed for a specific parcel of land and
determine which use would produce the greater benefit to the public.54 As
with the prior public use doctrine, this judicial balancing occurs only when
there is no clear legislative intent.55 This doctrine allows courts to allocate
public property in a more deliberative manner than by “relying solely
upon the arbitrary procedural posture of the parties” as being either the
condemnor or the condemnee.56 This is a minority rule, however, and many
courts have been disinclined to balance the relative benefits of the pro-
posed and existing uses.57 In jurisdictions applying the paramount public
use doctrine, conservation easements could thus be terminated to make
way for necessary economic development. As a corollary, they might not
be terminated if the court finds that the conservation value of the ease-
ment provides a greater public benefit than the proposed economic devel-
opment. Proceedings under the paramount public use doctrine would be
similar to cy pres proceedings in that the court would engage in a balanc-
ing test.58 A court invoking the paramount public use doctrine, however,
would retain the ability to extinguish any trust associated with the conser-
vation easement.59 The additional flexibility provided by the paramount
public use doctrine would therefore alleviate some of the problems created
by government-held conservation easements, at least when the condemnor
and the condemnee both hold a general power of eminent domain as dele-
gated from the legislature.
“Higher Use” than Public Use to Which Property Is Already Appropriated—State Takings,
49 A.L.R.5TH 769 (1997) (listing cases). California statutorily permits takings for a more
necessary public use under certain circumstances. See Naiman, supra note 51, at 908
(noting that the California statute codifies judicial balancing of uses of public land by
setting forth a list of rebuttable presumptions); Klein, supra note 34, at 1340–41 (listing
cases interpreting the California statute).
54 Naiman, supra note 51, at 898.
55 Id. at 920.
56 Id. at 917. “Common sense suggests . . . that the best public use of a site does not depend
upon whether the user happens to be a condemnor or a condemnee.” Id.
57 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.17[3] (rev. 3d ed. 2010); see
also Naiman, supra note 51, at 900 (noting that a court’s “reluctance to intrude upon the
legislative policy-making function” may inhibit it from balancing competing public uses).
58 See infra Part II.B.
59 See United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 236, 239–40 (1946) (holding that the federal
government could obtain title to land free of restrictions even though the land had been
held in trust by a municipal government); United States v. 11.037 Acres of Land, 685 F.
Supp. 214, 217 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that a federal condemnation action extinguished
a state-held public trust easement); 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 93 (2004) (noting
that state and federal governments have been able to take lands held in trust). See infra
Part II.B for discussion of the applicability of trust principles to conservation easements.
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B. Principles of Eminent Domain Affecting Conservation
Easements Held by Public Bodies at Different Levels of
Government
1. State Governments Vis-à-Vis Local Governments
As a sovereign power, a state has a power of eminent domain
restricted only by the U.S. Constitution and the respective state consti-
tution.60 The power to take property for public use without the property
owner’s consent is an “essential attribute of sovereignty,”61 and a state has
this power even if it is not expressly granted to it in the state constitution.62
The prior public use doctrine does not preclude states from condemning
property owned by local governments or state agencies.63 A state has a
superior right of eminent domain to that of a municipality and to a utility.64
A governmental or political subdivision of a state, by contrast, has no in-
herent power to condemn property of the state itself and must instead be
granted this power by the state legislature either expressly or by necessary
implication.65 Accordingly, a state will be able to condemn a conservation
easement held by a municipality or utility, but a municipality or utility
will be unable to condemn a conservation easement held by the state.
In some cases, statutes might preclude states from condemning
conservation easements. For example, some states provide for the pur-
chase of conservation easements over agricultural lands by statute and
require that certain conditions be met before the easements can be con-
demned.66 In Virginia, open-space easements created under the Virginia
60 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 23 (2007).
61 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.01[1] (rev. 3d ed. 2010);
accord Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1879).
62 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.01[1] (rev. 3d ed. 2010);
United States v. City of Tiffin, 190 F. 279, 280 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1911) (noting that the
states’ powers of eminent domain are inherent in their sovereignty and do not derive
from their constitutions).
63 See Tiffin, 190 F. at 281 (noting that the general rule that a condemnor may condemn
public-use property only with the express authorization of the legislature serves to protect
the sovereign from unauthorized uses of its power by municipal or private public service
corporations and that this rule does not apply to the sovereign itself); Klein, supra note
34, at 1308 § 3 (noting that a state has the sovereign power to condemn property within
its boundaries for public purposes “despite the fact that the property is already devoted
to a public use by a subdivision or agency of that state”).
64 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.17[4] (rev. 3d ed. 2010).
65 Klein, supra note 34, at 1326 § 8.
66 Nancy A. McLaughlin, Condemning Conservation Easements: Protecting the Public
Interest and Investment in Conservation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1897, 1930 (2008)
[hereinafter McLaughlin, Condemning Conservation Easements].
636 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 35:625
Open-Space Land Act are immune to condemnation and may not be re-
leased except when certain statutory criteria are met.67 In these situations,
the conservation easements themselves do not constrain the state’s power
of eminent domain; rather, competing public policies do so.68
2. The Federal Government Vis-à-Vis State and Local
Governments
The U.S. government receives its power of eminent domain from the
U.S. Constitution.69 No single clause in the Constitution grants the U.S.
government its power of eminent domain; rather, this power is derived
from the various enumerated powers granted to it, such as its powers over
commerce and post offices.70 The U.S. Constitution and acts of Congress
have supremacy over state legislation.71 The federal government, therefore,
has the authority to condemn state-owned lands.72 The federal government
may condemn municipal property to the same extent that it may condemn
state-owned property because a municipality is “a creature of the state.”73
Likewise, the federal government may condemn the property of a public
service corporation for proper purposes.74 Moreover, the federal government
is not constrained by the prior public use doctrine when condemning state
67 George C. Freeman, Jr., An Update on Virginia Law Applicable to the Possible Destruction
of “Perpetual” Easements on Historic Properties and Open Space by Condemnation: It All
Depends upon Who Is the Grantee, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 429, 429–30 (2008); see also
McLaughlin, supra note 25, at 411 (noting that “the mechanism for extinguishing open-
space easements to accommodate development and growth was built into the Open-Space
Land Act rather than the eminent domain laws of the state”).
68 McLaughlin, Condemning Conservation Easements, supra note 66, at 1930.
69 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.02[1] (rev. 3d ed. 2010).
70 Id. at § 3.02[2][a].
71 Id. at § 2.18; see also, e.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508,
534 (1941) (quoting Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17 (1927)) (noting that the constitutional
powers of federal government trump those of the state when the two conflict).
72 E.g., Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. at 534 (citing Wayne Cnty. v. United States, 53 Ct.
Cl. 417 (1918), aff’d 252 U.S. 574(1920)) (“The fact that land is owned by a state is no
barrier to its condemnation by the United States.”). Other than the usual constitutional
constraints on the exercise of eminent domain, the federal power to condemn state-
owned lands devoted to a public use is apparently also constrained to the extent that the
United States may not “arbitrarily imperil the very functions of the State itself,” United
States v. 4450.72 Acres of Land, 27 F. Supp. 167, 175 (D. Minn. 1939), but this would
not appear to be an issue in the context of conservation easements.
73 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.19 (rev. 3d ed. 2010).
74 Id. at § 2.21.
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lands,75 nor would application of the paramount public use doctrine protect
the state from federal condemnation of its lands.76
Although the federal government is not constitutionally proscribed
from condemning state-owned lands beyond the usual constitutional re-
strictions on eminent domain, it may be statutorily limited. For example,
the Energy Policy Act of 200577 grants the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission authority to issue permits to public utilities to build or modify
electric transmission facilities within an approved national electric trans-
mission corridor.78 Although these permits enable public utilities to exercise
the federal power of eminent domain to obtain the necessary rights-of-
way, they do not grant public utilities the power to condemn state-owned
or federally owned land.79
By contrast, state and local government bodies have no right of
eminent domain over federal property, absent express consent.80 This
75 United States v. Acquisition of 0.3114 Cuerdas of Condemnation Land, 753 F. Supp. 50,
54 (D.P.R. 1990); United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 685 (1896) (“[T]he
power of Congress to take land devoted to one public use for another and a different public
use upon making just compensation cannot be disputed.”); United States v. Jotham
Bixby Co., 55 F.2d 317, 319–20 (S.D. Cal. 1932) (“[T]he limitation which prohibits a
municipality from using for another and inconsistent purpose land already dedicated to a
public use, as, for example, a public park, does not apply against the government of the
United States.”), aff’d, C. M. Patten & Co. v. United States, 61 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1932),
rev’d and vacated as moot, 289 U.S. 705 (1933) (reversed and vacated on other grounds).
76 See Acquisition of 0.3114 Cuerdas of Condemnation Land, 753 F. Supp. at 54–55 (“We
may not . . . weigh the relative benefits of the two proposed public uses and make a judicial
finding that one is ‘superior’ to the other (meaning more important or more beneficial to
the public). The federal use is deemed to be superior precisely because it is the federal
use.”) (emphasis in original); 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 2.17[4] (rev. 3d ed. 2010) (noting that states cannot assert balancing of benefits of the
proposed and existing uses against the federal government).
77 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109–58, 119 Stat. 594. (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 15801–16524).
78 McLaughlin, Condemning Open Space, supra note 25, at 399.
79 Id. at 400.
80 Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 230 F. 328, 338 (8th Cir. 1915) (“The title of the
United States can be divested by no other power, by no other means, in no other mode, than
that which Congress shall sanction and prescribe. It cannot be done by the action of the
people or Legislature of a territory or state.”) (quoting Van Brocklin v. State of Tennessee,
117 U.S. 151 (1886)), modified on other grounds, 242 F. 924 (8th Cir. 1917); City of
Sacramento v. Sec’y of Housing & Urban Dev., 363 F. Supp. 736, 737 (E.D. Cal. 1972)
(noting that property belonging to the United States cannot be condemned without the
consent of Congress and explaining that “this rule is simply an application of the broader
principle of sovereign immunity”); 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 2.22 (rev. 3d ed. 2010) (“The power of a state to condemn federal lands within its ter-
ritorial limits is denied no matter what the existing federal use may be unless the federal
government consents to the condemnation.”).
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presents a problem because local and state government bodies have a
greater interest in advancing local development than does the federal
government, and given these government bodies’ lack of eminent domain
power over federally held property, federally held conservation easements
might prevent these governments from developing their localities as local
needs dictate. Despite Professor Korngold’s reasoning in his approval of
the holding in Kelo,81 eminent domain in this situation is powerless to
counteract the “frozen land utilization pattern”82 that inflexibly placed
conservation easements can create.
II. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF OBTAINING DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
A. Doctrine of Changed Conditions
The doctrine of changed conditions is an equitable doctrine that, at
common law, allowed a court to terminate an equitable servitude or a real
covenant “when changed conditions in or around the burdened land frus-
trated the purpose of the restriction or created an undue hardship on the
owner of the burdened land.”83 The doctrine of changed conditions calls for
an examination of several factors, including the parties’ intent, the foresee-
ability of the changed conditions, the location of these changes, the burdens
and benefits to the parties, and the duration of the challenged restriction.84
This doctrine has traditionally been applied only to real covenants and
equitable servitudes, or, more broadly, to promises regarding the land
rather than to interests in the land; easements, as interests in the land,
have traditionally been immune to the doctrine of changed conditions.85
Applying the doctrine of changed conditions to conservation ease-
ments raises difficult policy questions. The doctrine of changed conditions
does not easily apply to conservation easements created for general con-
servation purposes because, when the property around such easements
becomes developed and congested, these easements may be seen as serving
81 See supra Introduction, subpart A.
82 Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 2, at 1083.
83 Jeffrey A. Blackie, Note, Conservation Easements and the Doctrine of Changed
Conditions, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1188 (1989).
84 Id. at 1209.
85 Id. at 1194; see also Alexander R. Arpad, Private Transactions, Public Benefits, and
Perpetual Control over the Use of Real Property: Interpreting Conservation Easements as
Charitable Trusts, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 91, 123 (2002) (noting that the doctrine of
changed conditions traditionally does not apply to easements but that some commentators
argue for extending it to conservation easements and other servitudes).
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their purpose of preserving open space better than before the development,
and the surrounding development can even increase the value of the re-
strictions on the property.86 This doctrine is designed to terminate obsolete
covenants but fails to provide a way to “balanc[e] a strong public interest
in a new use for the land (perhaps for necessary industrial development,
affordable housing, or health care facilities) against the conservation value
exemplified by the easement held by a private organization.”87
Applying the doctrine of changed conditions is particularly problem-
atic if one considers conservation to constitute an efficient use of the land:
Open space, under this view, is not unproductive land.
Rather, it is both useful and necessary to preserve our
environment and the natural beauty of open space. When
open space is not viewed as wasted land, but as a produc-
tive and efficient use of land, application of the changed
conditions doctrine to terminate a natural state easement
subverts the policy.88
This view is particularly relevant in Virginia, where even the state consti-
tution codifies a strong policy preference for conservation.89 The doctrine of
changed conditions likely could not be successfully applied to terminate
conservation easements in Virginia or states with similar policy objectives.
B. Difficulties of Using Cy Pres Proceedings to Modify and
Terminate Conservation Easements
Many commentators argue that charitable trust principles should
be applied to conservation easements.90 In this line of reasoning, donated
86 Blackie, supra note 83, at 1218–19; see also Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note
2, at 1077 (“Proponents of the easement will argue that any open space is valuable and
especially necessary when surrounding conditions have worsened.”); Mahoney, supra note
7, at 778 (noting that many conservation easements arguably are designed to continue in
perpetuity in the face of changed circumstances).
87 Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 2, at 1077–78.
88 Blackie, supra note 83, at 1220 (internal footnote removed).
89 See VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (declaring the policy of the Commonwealth to “conserve,
develop, and utilize its natural resources, its public lands, and its historical sites and
buildings”).
90 See, e.g., Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation
Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421 (2005) [hereinafter McLaughlin, Rethinking the
Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements] (discussing at length why conservation
easements should be modified or terminated according to charitable trust principles).
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conservation easements should be treated as charitable trusts because
they are usually donated to a government entity or land trust for a specific
charitable purpose, namely the conservation of the burdened land.91 Trusts
may be created even if the parties do not label it a trust or understand
exactly what a trust is.92 Conservation easements thus can be deemed to be
held in trust if the parties had the intent to enter into a trust-like relation-
ship.93 Trusts where the public is the beneficiary are charitable trusts.94
Cy pres is a common-law doctrine that “permits a court of equity
to administer a charitable trust to conform as closely as possible to the pur-
pose for which the trust was created or, if that purpose cannot be achieved,
for some other charitable purpose.”95 It is unique to the context of charitable
trusts and provides for the reformation of a charitable trust to approximate
the settlor’s charitable intent when the trust, as originally conceived, “ ‘has
become impossible, unlawful or impracticable.’ ”96
In the context of conservation easements, courts would adapt the
easement to serve another conservation purpose consistent with the over-
all conservation goal of the easement.97 This doctrine is designed to make
the minimal changes necessary to reform the charitable trust and might
not be suitable for modifying or terminating conservation easements when
the public interest requires that the land be put to a different use.98 This
inflexibility might be somewhat reduced by statutes authorizing courts
to terminate one conservation easement while placing a similar parcel of
land under a substitute conservation easement.99
91 McLaughlin & Machlis, supra note 18, at 1573.
92 Arpad, supra note 85, at 128.
93 Id. at 130; see also C. Timothy Lindstrom, Hicks v. Dowd: The End of Perpetuity?, 8 WYO.
L. REV. 25, 73 (2008) (noting that, to find that a conservation easement is held as a chari-
table trust, a court must “find a clear intention on the part of the grantor of a conservation
easement . . . to create a trust”).
94 See Arpad, supra note 85, at 130.
95 Tauber v. Commonwealth ex rel. Kilgore, 562 S.E.2d 118, 128 (Va. 2002).
96 Arpad, supra note 85, at 124 (quoting In re Petition of Downer Home, 226 N.W. 2d 444,
450 (Wis. 1975)).
97 Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 2, at 1078.
98 See id.
99 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-131i (2009) (requiring municipalities to pay the state
the value of the open-space land upon selling it or converting it to a different use if
“comparable” land is not placed under easement to replace it; this applies only to
open-space land obtained with state grant money); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 5-906(e) (7)
(2010) (requiring municipalities to replace open-space land with land “of at least equiv-
alent area and of equal recreation or open space value” before any change in use; this
change in use must be approved by the state); MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-107 (2009)
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Applying the doctrine of cy pres will not effectively counter the
problem of poorly placed conservation easements and will make the modi-
fication or termination of these easements even more difficult. Applying
the doctrine of cy pres to conservation easements necessarily means that
the easement holder will no longer have the right to modify or terminate
a conservation easement without court approval.100 At least one commenta-
tor has argued that a suit to terminate a government-held conservation
easement in a cy pres proceeding should not be barred on grounds of sov-
ereign immunity.101 Even if a cy pres proceeding against the federal gov-
ernment is allowed to proceed, it seems unlikely that a court will agree to
terminate a conservation easement when the federal government seeks
to maintain the easement in its current form.102 The cy pres doctrine thus
does not adequately address the problem of poorly placed federal conser-
vation easements.
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORMS AT THE STATEWIDE LEVEL
A. Legislation Allowing Government Bodies to Terminate
Conservation Easements Regardless of the Charitable
Trust Doctrine
1. Policy Rationale
If government-held conservation easements are deemed to consti-
tute charitable trusts for the benefit of the public, the relevant policy ques-
tion becomes how one defines what it means to be “for the benefit of the
(requiring municipalities to replace converted open-space land with land “of at least equal
fair market value and of as nearly as feasible equivalent usefulness and location for use
as open-space land” within three years of the change in use); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1704(A)
(2009) (requiring the public body to replace converted open-space land with land “(a) of
at least equal fair market value, (b) of greater value as permanent open-space land than
the land converted or diverted and (c) of as nearly as feasible equivalent usefulness and
location for use as permanent open-space land . . . .”).
100 See Lindstrom, supra note 93, at 62.
101 See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Could Coalbed Methane Be the Death of Conservation
Easements?, WYO. LAWYER, Oct. 2006, at 18, 22 (noting that “[t]he purpose of governmental
immunity is to protect the public fisc” and suggesting that cy pres proceedings to terminate
conservation easements and redistribute the monetary proceeds to other conservation ease-
ments should not be barred by governmental immunity because they serve to protect the
public fisc).
102 See supra note 76 and accompanying text (noting that, in the condemnation context,
the federal use of land is deemed to be superior to a proposed state use).
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public[.]” A government body, after all, has a duty to use even land donated
in fee simple without any accompanying contractual restrictions for the
benefit of the public.103 A government body that seeks to terminate or mod-
ify a conservation easement to be able to build a highway, low-income
housing, or even a shopping mall has presumably already made the legis-
lative determination that the proposed use yields a greater benefit to the
public than the original conservation purpose. Particularly in the context
of a lower-level government body obtaining development rights from a fed-
eral or state government body, policy considerations thus suggest that gov-
ernment bodies should not be constrained by the charitable trust doctrine
when modifying and terminating conservation easements.
In the event that the charitable trust doctrine is applied to conser-
vation easements generally, the idea that government bodies are presump-
tively acting in the interest of the public when modifying or terminating
conservation easements should be recognized by creating statutorily de-
fined powers that apply to trustees holding conservation easements. This
is particularly important given the lack of evidence that the improper modi-
fication or termination of conservation easements is a prevalent problem
in the United States.104
2. The Proposed Statute
Using that policy framework as its point of departure, this note pro-
poses a statute that would give government bodies the power to modify or
terminate conservation easements without being forced to initiate cy pres
proceedings. This power should be construed to apply to all government
bodies whether or not the terms of the conservation easement make ref-
erence to the statute. The statute that this note proposes would apply only
to government bodies and would expressly not apply to private land trusts.
The proposed statute would read as follows:
Any public body that is the grantee of a conservation ease-
ment shall have the power to modify the terms of or termi-
nate any charitable trust deemed to have been created by
the granting of such conservation easement, without judi-
cial intervention, if the following conditions have first
103 See Arpad, supra note 85, at 126 (noting that both charitable organizations and gov-
ernment agencies “owe some degree of duty to use even absolute gifts for the benefit of
the public”).
104 Lindstrom, supra note 93, at 62.
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been satisfied: (a) the conservation easement must have
been held in trust for no fewer than twenty-one (21) years,
whether solely by the public body seeking to modify or ter-
minate the conservation easement or by more than one
public and/or charitable body; and (b) the public body seek-
ing to modify or terminate the conservation easement must
have sought and received legislative approval of the pro-
posed modification or termination of the conservation ease-
ment. The powers granted by this Section shall not be
construed to apply to private land trusts or to any other
nongovernmental charitable organization.
The requirement that the easement be held for at least twenty-
one years uses what is admittedly an arbitrary number. This minimum
period of time is designed to ensure that the easement will still serve to
slow the rate of development of an area, in accordance with the intent of
the donor, yet not entirely impede the necessary growth of a community,
as determined by the competent government authorities.105 Legislatures
would be free to adopt a longer minimum period of time, but in the opinion
of the author, a minimum period shorter than twenty-one years would
unduly impinge upon donors’ reasonable expectations when giving con-
servation easements to government bodies.106
105 It should be noted that the twenty-one-year minimum period is similar to the planning
horizons used by many land planners. Although planning horizons used in comprehensive
plans are typically between twenty and fifty years, the most common horizon is twenty
years. PRINCE EDWARD CNTY. (VA.), PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY 2005 COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
3 (2005), available at http://www.co.prince-edward.va.us/pdf/PZ_PE%20Co%20Comp%20
Plan_Final.pdf. Thus, for localities where new conservation easements are required to
conform to the local comprehensive plan, see infra Part III.B, the majority of the proposed
twenty-one-year period would overlap with the planning horizon of the comprehensive
plan. Consequently, the locality’s necessary growth would likely be only minimally impaired
during the first twenty-one years of the easement’s existence. This assumes, of course, that
the comprehensive plan is regularly reviewed and amended. See, e.g., PRINCE EDWARD
CNTY., supra, at 3 (noting that the comprehensive plan must be reviewed at least once
every five years to determine whether amendments are necessary).
106 See Nancy A. McLaughlin & W. William Weeks, Hicks v. Dowd, Conservation Ease-
ments, and the Charitable Trust Doctrine: Setting the Record Straight, 10 WYO. L. REV. 73,
91–92 (2010) (discussing conservation easement donors’ expectations generally and noting
the chilling effect that governments’ unmitigated termination of conservation easements
might have on donations). Although donors are typically told that conservation easements
will protect their land in perpetuity, Mahoney, supra note 7, at 750–51, these easements
are still subject to the exercise of eminent domain at any time, see supra notes 9–10 and
644 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 35:625
3. Limitations on the Usefulness of the Proposed Statute
Such a statute is important to enable government bodies to promote
local development and planning without becoming ensnared by the fidu-
ciary relationship inuring from a charitable trust when these government
bodies determine that the public, for whose benefit the conservation ease-
ment was originally created, would be better served by dedicating the land
to a different use. It is important to note that, although this proposed stat-
ute removes one legal impediment to the modification or termination of
government-held conservation easements, government bodies are still sub-
ject to other influences that might preclude such modification or termi-
nation,107 and, as such, exempting them from the charitable trust doctrine
would not grant them the unfettered ability to terminate conservation
easements at will.
Such a statute, moreover, would apply only when the government
body holding the easement and the government body seeking to develop
the servient land are the same or, alternatively, when the federal govern-
ment voluntarily relinquishes an easement to a state or local government
body to be modified or terminated. The proposed statute is also not useful
in the context of eminent domain because the government already has the
authority to condemn charitable trusts.108 The proposed statute therefore
does little to solve the problem created by federally held conservation ease-
ments interfering with local development. Some other form of legislation
is necessary to deal with this problem.
accompanying text (discussing the use of eminent domain to terminate conservation ease-
ments); infra text accompanying note 108 (discussing the condemnation of charitable
trusts). Donors’ expectations that conservation easements will protect land forever are
therefore not necessarily reasonable.
107 See McLaughlin & Machlis, supra note 18, at 1580 (noting, for example, that failing to
honor easement donors’ intentions by cavalierly modifying or terminating conservation ease-
ments might “chill future conservation easement donations” because “failing to honor the
intent of charitable donors is likely to result in fewer charitable donations”). McLaughlin
and Machlis also warn of “the political, financial, and other pressures that may be brought
to bear on both governmental and nonprofit holders to release or terminate conservation
easements,” id., yet fail to note that political pressures can also exist to discourage modify-
ing or terminating these easements. See id.
108 See Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Eminent Domain: Right to Condemn Property
Owned or Used by Private Educational, Charitable, or Religious Organization, 80 A.L.R.3D
833, 837 § 2[a] (1977) (noting that property owned by charitable organizations is not barred
from being taken by eminent domain); supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing
the condemnation of trusts).
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B. State Legislation Requiring that New Conservation Easements
Conform to the Local Comprehensive Plan
An important way of addressing the problem of poorly placed
conservation easements is to prevent these easements from being created
in the first place. One way of doing this is by requiring new conservation
easements to conform to a locality’s comprehensive plan. Such a statute
already exists in Virginia: “No conservation easement shall be valid and en-
forceable unless the limitations or obligations created thereby conform in
all respects to the comprehensive plan at the time the easement is granted
for the area in which the real property is located.”109 Several states have
similar statutes requiring proposed conservation easements to conform
to such local land-use plans or to be approved by a public official.110
Such a statute mitigates the problem of poorly placed conservation
easements by requiring new conservation easements to be located in places
deemed proper by the locality’s current vision of its future growth and its
current development goals. Such a statute would in effect enable local
zoning boards to prohibit conservation easements from being granted
within specific zones, even if the land to be placed under easement had
some unique value.111 Nevertheless, a locality’s best efforts at planning
its growth will never entirely prevent conservation easements from being
placed in locations that will later need to be developed to further the public
good. At least some of these poorly placed easements are likely to be held
by the federal government.112
109 VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1010(E) (2009).
110 Nancy A. McLaughlin, A Constructive Reformist’s Perspective on Voluntary Conservation
Easements, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE (Aug. 31, 2005), http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.
com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=3821&section=home [hereinafter McLaughlin,
A Constructive Reformist’s Perspective].
111 See id. (arguing that requiring all conservation easements to meet local approval might
inhibit the creation of easements that protect sites of national conservation value, “as local
governments can be expected to give greater weight to local economic interests than to
national conservation interests”). McLaughlin fails to mention, however, that the federal
government could still protect these sites of national conservation value by acquiring them
in fee simple. Land was acquired for conservation purposes “almost invariably” in fee
simple until well into the twentieth century. Mahoney, supra note 7, at 748; see also Karen
A. Jordan, Perpetual Conservation: Accomplishing the Goal Through Preemptive Federal
Easement Programs, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401, 403 (1993) (“The government can readily
control land uses, and avoid the complex issues arising when federal programs affect
states’ rights or private property rights, by purchasing full fee title to environmentally
significant lands.”).
112 See supra notes 17–28 and accompanying text (discussing the increasing prevalence
of federally held conservation easements).
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Moreover, a statute requiring conservation easements to conform
to the local comprehensive plan is preventive in nature and does nothing
to allow states and localities to deal with federally held conservation ease-
ments once they are already in place. Therefore, although such a statute
might alleviate the problem of poorly placed federally held conservation
easements by preventing them ex ante,113 it does not entirely solve the
problem. Some other remedial solution is needed.
IV. LEARNING FROM MEDICAID: DECENTRALIZED ACQUISITION AND
ADMINISTRATION OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
A. Introduction
Although the solutions proposed earlier in this note can mitigate
the potentially adverse effects of federally held conservation easements
on state and local development, none is able to solve the problem entirely.
The problem inherent in each of these proposed solutions is that they do
not directly address how to deal with federal conservation easements that
already exist in the event that some body other than the federal govern-
ment seeks to have these easements modified or terminated. The federal
113 There is some uncertainty as to whether a state statute merely governing the permissible
placement of conservation easements would be enforceable against the federal government.
See North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 316-20 (1983) (refusing to apply North
Dakota statutes purporting to place limitations on federal acquisitions of wetlands ease-
ments that North Dakota had previously authorized unconditionally); United States v.
Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 595-97 (1973) (holding that state laws that
are “aberrant or hostile” to the interests of the federal government will not be applied in
federal court; a Louisiana statute retroactively altering federal mineral rights was such
a hostile law); United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906, 911 (8th Cir. 1974) (enforcing the
terms of a wetlands preservation easement even though such easements were not rec-
ognized as valid property interests under North Dakota law). But see United States v.
California, 655 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Little Lake for the proposition that state
law may not be applied where “state law would actually frustrate rather than only hinder
a federal program” (emphasis added) and invoking Georgia Power Co. v. 54.20 Acres of
Land, 563 F.2d 1178, 1189 (5th Cir. 1977) (overruled on other grounds, Georgia Power Co.
v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980)); Batton v. United States, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15430, *14-15 (W.D. La. Mar. 8, 2006) (suggesting that, when determining whether a state
law is aberrant or hostile under Little Lake, relevant factors include whether the state law
existed at the time of the federal acquisition, whether similar laws are prevalent among
the several states, and whether the state law serves “clearly legitimate and important
state interests”). See generally Jordan, supra note 111 (arguing that Congress has the con-
stitutional authority to enact a statute granting federally held conservation easements
preemptive authority over state law).
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government would always be able to trump the proposed local use because
of the supremacy of federal law.114 Any reforms would thus have to occur
at the federal level.
Accordingly, this section proposes the solution of moving the policy
discussion regarding the funding of conservation easements from the state-
wide level to the nationwide level. In so doing, the federal government
should not seek to enact some sort of nationwide comprehensive plan, or
even a plan setting forth quotas for conservation; this would be needless
micromanaging of the states’ conservation programs. Rather, the federal
government should divest itself of its role in directly managing conservation
easements. By providing the states the funding to manage conservation
easements in a federal-state partnership similar to the Medicaid program,
greater flexibility in managing conservation easements could be achieved.
B. Taking the Federal Government Out of the Business of
Managing Conservation Easements
The division of authority between the federal and state governments
regarding land conservation implicates issues of federalism and subsid-
iarity. As a matter of federal policy, one must ask whether the federal
government should be involved in monitoring and enforcing conservation
easements. Land conservation is a worthy policy objective, but this objec-
tive could likely be carried out by the states just as well.115
Providing states, rather than the federal government, with the pri-
mary authority over conservation easements better satisfies federalism
and subsidiarity concerns. Subsidiarity is a concept that holds that “noth-
ing should be done by a larger and more complex organization which can
be done as well by a smaller and simpler organization.”116 Adhering to
this principle leads to a decentralization of government activities.117 The
114 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause); see also supra note 76 and accom-
panying text (noting that the paramount public use doctrine would not enable states to
be able to condemn federal land).
115 See Jessica O. Lippmann, The Emergence of Exacted Conservation Easements, 84 NEB.
L. REV. 1043, 1055-56 (2006).
116 David A. Bosnich, The Principle of Subsidiarity, RELIGION & LIBERTY (Acton Inst. for
the Study of Religion & Liberty, Grand Rapids, Mich.), Jul.-Aug. 1996, at 9, available at
http://www.acton.org/sites/v4.acton.org/files/pdf/rl_v06n4.pdf.
117 See id. at 9 (noting that subsidiarity holds that “any activity which can be performed by
a more decentralized entity should be”). By this logic, states arguably might find it better
to delegate the acquisition and administration of conservation easements to localities. This
note does not examine this topic, although it should be noted that urban growth typically
extends across multiple localities within a given state. See VA. CHAPTER, AMERICAN
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principle of subsidiarity is violated when the federal government takes
over the rights and responsibilities of state and local governments.118 This
principle is incorporated into federalism,119 the essence of which may be
described as being that “ ‘states as states’ have legitimate interests which
the national government must respect even though federal laws, if consti-
tutionally proper, are supreme.”120 The constitutional division of author-
ity between the federal and state governments is not intended to protect
states as political entities, but rather is intended to protect individuals.121
Given that conservation easements are typically described as being for the
benefit of the public,122 which is composed of individuals, subsidiarity is
thus a relevant concern.
Determining the precise details of conservation planning might be
more effectively handled at the state level rather than both the federal and
state levels. If conservation planning is consolidated in the states, the
state legislatures would be able to set forth a unified vision of conserva-
tion planning within each respective state, rather than being faced with
a patchwork of state and federal conservation easements. Development
occurs primarily at the local level, and so states would naturally be better
able to tailor policy governing development to local needs than would the
federal government.123 This approach thus addresses planning concerns
better than the current “business as usual” way of acquiring conservation
easements, which is not sustainable over the long term.124
Furthermore, states would be in a better position to monitor
conservation easements, detect violations, and enforce the terms of the
PLANNING ASS’N, PATTERNS OF SUBURBAN GROWTH: A GRAPHIC PRESENTATION OF SUBURBAN
DEVELOPMENT IN VIRGINIA: PAST PATTERNS AND FUTURE OPTIONS 3 (2000), available at
http://apavirginia.org/documents/other-publications/Patterns_of_Suburban_Growth.pdf
(noting that “growth is seldom balanced within a political jurisdiction”). The coordinating
functions of the state would thus seem to be necessary in administering the acquisition
of conservation easements.
118 See Bosnich, supra note 116, at 9.
119 See id. at 10 (arguing that the Founders intended the federal government to do “only
those things which the individual states could not effectively do for themselves”).
120 Jordan, supra note 111, at 442.
121 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
122 See McLaughlin, Condemning Conservation Easements, supra note 66, at 1937 (noting
that conservation easements “are conveyed to and acquired by government entities and
charitable organizations to be held and enforced for the benefit of the public”).
123 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting that, by holding conservation ease-
ments, the federal government might usurp a local community’s ability to shape policy
democratically).
124 See supra Introduction (discussing the problems that might ensue from states’ inability
to condemn federal conservation easements).
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easements.125 Except perhaps for easements located in Maryland and
Northern Virginia, state agencies would be located geographically closer to
the conservation easements that they would administer than would the cor-
responding federal agencies, presumably located in or around Washington,
D.C.126 The geographic proximity of branch offices of federal agencies would
lessen this distinction, but even these branch offices might have to coor-
dinate their monitoring and enforcement of conservation easements with
a central Washington, D.C. office thousands of miles away.127
Allowing states to control government acquisition of conservation
easements also addresses the aforementioned policy clash between con-
serving open space and providing for ways of developing renewable energy
sources.128 To date, no legislation has been passed mandating nationwide
RPS, and all current RPS programs are administered at the state level.129
Even if legislation mandating a federal RPS were to pass, this legislation
would most likely set minimum national standards that states would be
free to exceed.130 As such, much RPS policy will remain in the domain of
state legislatures. If the federal government continues to acquire and
administer conservation easements in large numbers—the “business as
usual” method—the federal government could potentially interfere with
states’ needs to use land to develop renewable energy resources.
If both conservation easement policy and RPS policy are made at
the state level, a greater potential exists to harmonize the two competing
policy interests. A nationwide RPS policy would be ineffective in doing this
because states have access to different renewable resources and have dif-
ferent conservation needs;131 these policy determinations would necessarily
125 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (local governments will by definition be closer
to local easements than the federal government).
126 The distance between Washington, D.C. and San Francisco, for example, is approximately
2840 miles. See Interactive Distances Between Major U.S. Cities, TRAVEL NOTES, http://
www.travelnotes.org/NorthAmerica/distances.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2011) (providing
a mileage calculator).
127 See supra note 126.
128 See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text.
129 See The American Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman-Markey Bill), PEW CENTER
ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/acesa (last visited Jan. 24,
2011) (discussing the legislative history of the Waxman-Markey Bill, which would impose
nationwide RPS goals); see also States with Renewable Portfolio Standards, supra note
14 (discussing RPS as a state policy).
130 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 111TH CONG., AMERICAN CLEAN
ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT (H.R. 2454), at 1–2 (June 23, 2009) (discussing the proposed
federal RPS).
131 See, e.g., AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, WIND POWER TODAY (2007) (noting that forty-six
states have sites with winds adequate to support commercial power production); Geothermal
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be made on a state-by-state basis. For example, states with a high level of
onshore wind might place a greater emphasis on “developing” open space
than states relying more on renewable energy sources that require a
smaller geographic footprint, such as geothermal resources.132 Similarly,
states with a large number of preexisting hydroelectric facilities might
decide that maintaining open space free from aesthetically displeasing
wind turbines is a more important policy objective than developing those
wind resources. It is precisely these sorts of individualized local and state
policy determinations that the federal government should avoid attempt-
ing to make.133
Land conservation, moreover, is largely a local issue. Preserving
open space has little impact on citizens of other states while they remain
in the other states.134 This is unlike wind pollution, for example, which can
easily cross state boundaries and cause harmful effects in other states.135
The migratory nature of wind pollution makes it a logical object of federal
regulation.136 Conservation easements, however, do not move from state
to state. Conservation easements affect only the citizens of the respective
states in which the easements are located and travelers entering those
states, except insofar as vegetation in open-space land might reduce green-
house gases in the atmosphere and the related habitat preservation might
benefit migratory animals.137 These are concerns that would otherwise
Explained: Where Geothermal Energy Is Found, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T
OF ENERGY (Feb. 19, 2010), http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=
geothermal_where (noting that most accessible geothermal energy in the United States
is located in the western states and Hawaii).
132 See Fathali Ghahremani, The Possibility of Large-Scale Geothermal Power Plants,
PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL ISSUES, Fall 2009, at 33, 35 (2009), available at http://www
.perspectivesonglobalissues.com/0401/fullissue0401.pdf (noting that a geothermal plant
and an equivalent fossil-fuel plant would have a similar physical footprint); id. at 33 (noting
that hydroelectric, tidal, and wind power require large physical footprints).
133 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
134 See Lippman, supra note 115, at 1072.
135 See News Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Duke Energy to Spend $93 Million to
Resolve Clean Air Act Violations (Dec. 22, 2009), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/
admpress.nsf/0/2520f12f7372fe1d85257694005ab7a7 (“Air pollution from power plants
can travel significant distances downwind, crossing state lines and creating region-wide
health problems.”).
136 See Air Quality Notices Media Kit: Controls, WIS. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES. (last revised
Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/news/mediakits/mk_air_quality.asp (follow the
“Controls” hyperlink) (“Federal rules deal with the problem of [airborne] pollutants that
cross state boundaries . . . .”).
137 See McLaughlin, A Constructive Reformist’s Perspective, supra note 110 (noting that
“significant public benefits in the form of ‘ecosystem services’ can flow from the protection of
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properly be the subject of federal legislation and regulation. Unlike the
example of wind pollution prior to the enactment of the Clean Air Act,138
however, states will probably continue acquiring conservation easements
in the absence of direct federal intervention.139 This is not an area that will
go untouched if the federal government does not intervene. Although these
interstate effects suffice to give the federal government the power to acquire
and administer conservation easements,140 conservation easements provide
no immediately apparent policy justification for direct federal regulation
or, in this case, acquisition and administration.
Maintaining the status quo whereby the federal government is
acquiring conservation easements at a rapid rate is not a viable model.
An increasing proliferation of federal conservation easements could lead
to the “frozen land utilization pattern,” which Professor Korngold warns
against.141 Although there is an important national interest in conserva-
tion, some other way must be selected to advance this federal policy ob-
jective while also allowing states to advance their own conservation and
development policies.
C. Medicaid’s Structure and Funding: A Model Federal-State
Cooperative Relationship
Any federal-state program designed to prevent Korngold’s “frozen
land utilization pattern”142 must be cooperative in nature. One preexist-
ing program that incorporates a federal-state cooperative relationship is
Medicaid.143 Medicaid is a “federal / state partnership program” providing
healthcare benefits to specified groups of low-income Americans.144 A
such lands”); Grazing Lands Conservation Initiative (GLCI), NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION
SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/glci
(discussing the societal benefits of preserving grazing lands).
138 Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006)).
139 See supra notes 15–28 and accompanying text (discussing the increasing role of
governments in acquiring conservation easements).
140 See Jordan, supra note 111, at 424–27 (discussing Congress’s power to regulate envi-
ronmental matters under the Commerce Clause); id. at 441–42 (discussing the ability of
the federal government to acquire conservation easements through its property power and
spending power).
141 See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 2, at 1083.
142 Id.
143 $15 Billion in Medicaid Relief Headed to States, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/medicaidfmap.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
144 Id.
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state’s “participation in Medicaid is optional, but every state has opted
to participate.”145 The roles of the federal and state governments in this
partnership can be described as follows:
Because Medicaid is a partnership, states and the federal
government each have a role in designing and paying for
each state’s program. While states have some flexibility in
determining what benefits they provide, who will be eligible
and how much they will pay health care providers, they
must work within federal guidelines. In turn, the federal
government pays a portion of each state’s Medicaid costs.146
The federal government provides broad guidelines within which the states
must administer the Medicaid program.147 The states otherwise have “wide
flexibility in the design and implementation of their Medicaid programs.”148
Because of this broad discretion, “Medicaid spending varies considerably
from state to state on both a per capita and per beneficiary basis.”149 De-
spite this, the state Medicaid program must be approved by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services.150
The percentage of Medicaid costs paid for by federal funding varies
according to each state’s relative wealth; federal funding pays for a greater
percentage of a state’s Medicaid costs in states with lower per-capita in-
comes.151 This federal funding rate is adjusted on a yearly basis in response
to “economic changes in the states”152 according to a statutory formula.153
The federal funding rate for costs incurred in administering Medicaid,
145 ANDY SCHNEIDER ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE MEDICAID RESOURCE
BOOK 82 (2002), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/
security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14261.
146 $15 Billion in Medicaid Relief Headed to States, supra note 143.
147 KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID FACTS, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,THE MEDICAID
PROGRAM AT A GLANCE (2008), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7235
_03-2.pdf.
148 About Medicaid, FAMILIES USA, http://www.familiesusa.org/issues/medicaid/about
-medicaid.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011); accord SCHNEIDER, supra note 145, at 83
(“States choosing to participate in Medicaid enjoy substantial flexibility with respect to
defining a benefits package, establishing eligibility criteria, and setting provider reimburse-
ment rates.”).
149 SCHNEIDER, supra note 145, at 83.
150 Id. at 96.
151 $15 Billion in Medicaid Relief Headed to States, supra note 143.
152 Id.
153 SCHNEIDER, supra note 145, at 93.
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rather than in paying for covered services, is fixed and does not vary from
state to state.154 States obtain Medicaid funding as a partial reimburse-
ment of eligible medical expenses that they have already incurred.155 There
is no cap on the total federal matching funds that may be provided to any
individual state in a given year.156
D. The Proposed Program: Matching States’ Spending on
Conservation Easements with Federal Funds
1. Forestalling the Future Acquisition of Federal Conservation
Easements by Delegating This Role to the States
This note proposes setting up a Medicaid-like system for acquiring
conservation easements. Instead of funneling money to the USDA and
other federal agencies, the federal government would provide funding
to the states to acquire and administer conservation easements. Thus,
although federal funding would be used for the conservation easements,
title to the conservation easements would be held in the name of the
state or state agency. Congress would enunciate broad policy objectives
and allow the states to work out the policy details to be implemented in
each state.157
Such a system would have many advantages and would address
many of the concerns raised in prior sections of this note. First, if states
hold the title to the conservation easements instead of the federal govern-
ment, then the concerns over states’ inability to condemn federally held
conservation easements disappear.158 Federal conservation easements
would no longer be an impediment to localities’ growth.159 The easements
154 See id. at 95 (noting that the default rate for matching Medicaid administrative expenses
is 50%).
155 See CTR. FOR MEDICAID AND STATE OPERATIONS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009, FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS FROM STATES 19 (2009), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/Recovery/
Downloads/ARRA_FAQs.pdf (noting that within the context of recently increased federal
Medicaid funding, a state “may not draw funds for expenditures it has not incurred”); id.
at 2 (noting that the recently increased federal Medicaid funding will be implemented on
a cash basis and generally describing how to determine the eligibility of prior expenditures
for that increased funding).
156 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 145, at 83 (“The federal government matches state spending
on an open-ended basis.”).
157 See id. at 91 (discussing variations in state Medicaid policies).
158 See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the inability of states to condemn federal property).
159 See supra text accompanying notes 80–82 (discussing states’ inability to condemn
federally held conservation easements that obstruct growth).
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would instead be held at the state and local levels, or by nonprofit land
trusts, and citizens would be able to have more direct access to their
representatives to shape land-use policy.160
Providing states with federal funds to acquire and manage conser-
vation easements would insulate states’ conservation budgets from sudden
changes in economic realities and political attitudes in each state. At least
one commentator has suggested that, despite the public benefits provided
by conservation, it could prove difficult to obtain public support for funding
of conservation easements on otherwise private land to which the public
has no access.161 Because the federal government receives taxes from citi-
zens in all the states, areas of the country that consider conservation to
be a higher priority would in effect be able to subsidize conservation efforts
in parts of the country that do not have the same high regard for conser-
vation. This nationwide funding would thus enable the important federal
policy objective of conservation162 to be carried out despite local opposition
or apathy regarding the use of local funds.
Similarly, the broad geographic reach of federal tax revenues would
largely immunize conservation funds from economic downturns occurring
only in localized areas of the country. Just as with Medicaid spending,
states affected by an economic downturn might choose to reduce conserva-
tion spending and divert those funds to other uses, especially in states that
have enacted balanced-budget requirements.163 Federal funding could pro-
vide a baseline amount on which state conservation programs could rely to
maintain their current conservation easements in that situation. The pro-
posed funding structure would be similar to Medicaid in that the level of
funding would not be reduced because of a localized economic downturn.164
The extent of federal funding itself might vary according to the
national political mood. State legislatures, as with Medicaid funding, would
be free to provide additional state funding to offset any decreases in the
federal matching rate and thus receive equivalent or greater aggregate
160 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the federal government’s potential
to obstruct the shaping of local land use policy).
161 McLaughlin, A Constructive Reformist’s Perspective, supra note 110.
162 See Jordan, supra note 111, at 403 (noting that Congress has made “special efforts” in
land conservation).
163 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 145, at 87 (noting that states having reduced tax revenues
because of an economic downturn might choose to reduce spending on Medicaid and that
most states have balanced-budget requirements).
164 See id. (noting that federal Medicaid matching funds are counter-cyclical in that they
actually increase as states are affected by economic downturns because more individuals
will become eligible for the Medicaid program during such downturns).
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federal funding,165 assuming that the state has not reached its statutory
cap on conservation matching funds for the year. Even if the state had
received the full amount of conservation funds for the year, for example,
if the federal government had reduced the total funding allotted to each
state in response to its own budgetary crisis, the state legislature would
still be free to authorize increased state funds above and beyond what
the federal government would be willing to match.
In certain limited circumstances, a particular conservation ease-
ment might uniquely meet some federal conservation objective, just as
national parks or national historical sites do.166 The federal government
might wish to retain ownership of such conservation easements and would
be justified in doing so. The acquisition of conservation easements by the
federal government should be subject to the same stringent standards as
for the acquisition and development of new national parks and should other-
wise be treated similarly.167 Given the limited nature of conservation ease-
ments in terms of public access and use,168 however, few situations would
justify the creation of a federally held conservation easement under the
scheme proposed by this note that would not also justify, and almost re-
quire, the acquisition of a fee simple interest in the land.169 The federal gov-
ernment’s conservation efforts, where federal action is required, would thus
not be unduly constrained.170 Absent reasons for acquiring a conservation
165 See id. (noting that a state facing an economic downturn “could also choose to maintain
(or even increase) its level of Medicaid spending, thereby maintaining (or increasing) the
amount of federal revenues flowing into its economy” because of the nature of the federal
matching arrangement).
166 See, e.g., Acadia Nat’l Park, Land Resources, NAT’L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.nps.gov/acad/parkmgmt/rm_landresources.htm.
167 See Brenda Smith, Criteria for Parkland, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR, http://www.nps.gov/legacy/criteria.html (last updated Jan. 2003).
168 See McLaughlin, A Constructive Reformist’s Perspective, supra note 110 (“One can
readily imagine the challenges that would be associated with raising funds to monitor and
enforce easements encumbering privately-owned land to which the public has neither
physical nor visual access.”).
169 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. One such situation might be the use of con-
servation easements to create buffer zones around military bases, where the conservation
is undertaken to ensure the continued viability of military bases and to limit nuisance
to adjacent landowners rather than for the sake of conservation itself. See, e.g., Jessica
Metcalf, Fort Huachaca Conservation Easements Reach 1,400 Acres, ENVTL. UPDATE, Fall
2007, http://aec.army.mil/usaec/newsroom/update/fall07/fall0710.html (describing the Army
Compatible Use Buffer (“ACUB”) program).
170 See supra note 111 (noting that the federal government would retain the ability to acquire
sites of national significance in fee simple even if local planning boards, under the auspices
of statutes requiring conservation easements to conform to localities’ comprehensive plans
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easement of similar magnitude to those for acquiring land for a national
park, acquisition of conservation easements at the federal level should
be sharply curtailed and should instead be delegated to the states.
2. Divesting the Federal Government of the Conservation
Easements that It Currently Holds
As a part of this shift to state ownership of conservation easements,
the states should be given the option of purchasing or otherwise receiving
the conservation easements currently held by the federal government,
effectively divesting the federal government of most of its conservation
easements. As the federal government shifts its funding for conservation
easements to the states, transferring the preexisting federal conservation
easements would almost become necessary. Thus, this system would both
prophylactically and retroactively solve the problem of federally held
conservation easements.
A less drastic measure to transfer title in federal conservation ease-
ments to the states would be to enact a federal statute allowing states to
condemn these federal easements. Under such a statute, states would be
able to condemn or buy out federally held conservation easements on an
as-needed basis. Regardless of the means chosen to do so, the federal gov-
ernment should divest itself of its conservation easements. This divestiture
is necessary to allow states the flexibility to plan for their future develop-
ment and conservation needs without being unduly hampered by federal
conservation easements that either no longer serve their original purpose
or otherwise frustrate local public policy.
E. Limitations on the Analogy to Medicaid for Funding
Conservation Easements
Any analogy between Medicaid and a program for purchasing and
maintaining conservation easements will necessarily be limited because
the two would have manifestly different policy goals. Medicaid is intended
to provide health and long-term care benefits to qualified low-income indi-
viduals.171 Tax deductions for conservation easements, however, primarily
benefit higher-income individuals because most low-income individuals
either do not itemize their tax returns or do not have sufficient tax liability
to benefit from the full tax deduction allowable.172 Although Medicaid might
or otherwise to obtain local approval, forbade placing the site under a conservation ease-
ment so as to further local economic interests).
171 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 145, at 86–87 (detailing policy objectives).
172 See McLaughlin, Condemning Open Space, supra note 25, at 404 (noting that “land rich,
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have incidental societal effects by helping to prevent the spread of disease,
it is primarily intended to benefit individuals directly.173 Conservation ease-
ments, on the other hand, are intended to bestow a wider societal benefit
in preserving open space.174
Medicaid and a program for funding conservation easements would
also have a different way of operating. Medicaid is an entitlement program,
giving individuals a legally enforceable right to eligible medical care and
also giving states a legally enforceable right to obtain federal matching
funds for providing funding for such medical care.175 This note does not
suggest granting individuals an entitlement to obtain payment for con-
servation easements or even to require states to accept an individual’s
donation of a conservation easement. States should examine each pro-
posed conservation easement in light of proposed growth patterns in the
area, proposed development, and other factors that the state may deem
relevant. Requiring states to accept conservation easements would not
entirely eliminate the benefits associated with placing these easements
under state control, but such a requirement would hamper states in their
ability to plan for the future or, alternatively, result in increased use of
the power of eminent domain and thus increased spending.
Moreover, a program to fund conservation easements should not
be an open-ended commitment from the federal government, as Medicaid
is.176 In this regard, the proposed program should be more like the State
Children’s Health Insurance Program (“SCHIP”). SCHIP, like Medicaid,
entitles states to matching funds, but the SCHIP funds available to each
state have an annual cap.177 This note does not necessarily propose increas-
ing federal spending for conservation easements; rather, it proposes merely
rerouting federal spending to the states. Although preserving open space
is an important policy concern underlying government funding for conser-
vation easements,178 unlimited funding might have the unintended side
effect of encouraging states to acquire even poorly placed conservation
cash poor” landowners might not have sufficient tax liability to absorb the full benefit of
tax credits offered for donating conservation easements).
173 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 145, at 83 (noting that Medicaid benefits are limited to
individuals who qualify).
174 See McLaughlin, Condemning Conservation Easements, supra note 66, at 1937 (noting
that conservation easements “are conveyed to and acquired by government entities and
charitable organizations to be held and enforced for the benefit of the public”).
175 SCHNEIDER, supra note 145, at 83.
176 See supra note 156 and accompanying text (noting that there is no annual cap on federal
Medicaid funding provided to the states).
177 SCHNEIDER, supra note 145, at 87.
178 See supra note 137 (discussing societal benefits of conservation easements).
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easements, impeding communities’ natural growth.179 This is particularly
true because most conservation easements are donated, not sold,180 and
so most of the federal matching funds provided by the proposed program
would be given to the states for the maintenance of conservation ease-
ments and not to conservation easement donors.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, much of the threat of a “frozen land utilization
problem”181 comes not from conservation easements held by private land
trusts, but rather from easements held by the federal government, over
which the states will have no power of eminent domain.182 States should
seek to alleviate the effects of this federal-state conflict by declining to
adopt the charitable trust doctrine in the context of government-held con-
servation easements183 and by adopting statutes requiring new conserva-
tion easements to conform to the local comprehensive plan.184 Ultimately,
however, the only comprehensive solution to this conflict is to divest the
federal government of its conservation easements and to delegate the re-
sponsibility of administering them to the states.185 Doing so will not only
eliminate potential conflicts between federal conservation goals and state
and local development needs; it will also result in more effective conser-
vation easement planning and management.186
To the extent that state law prohibits the usage of eminent domain
for economic development,187 much of this discussion will be purely aca-
demic, as states will be unable to condemn conservation easements held
by the federal government or by anyone else. Although his analysis is
incomplete, Professor Korngold is otherwise correct in asserting that the
power of eminent domain is an essential tool to correct for conservation
easements that have outlived their purpose.188
179 See supra notes 4–14 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of poorly placed
conservation easements).
180 See McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements, supra
note 90, at 430–31 (noting that most conservation easements are donated).
181 Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 2, at 1083.
182 See supra Part I.B.2.
183 See supra Part III.A.
184 See supra Part III.B.
185 See supra Part IV.
186 See supra Part IV.
187 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing post-Kelo state legislation to restrict
the use of eminent domain for economic development).
188 See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 2, at 1082.
